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Abstract
We analyse the eﬀects of investment decisions and firms’ internal organisation on the
eﬃciency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are en-
dogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often
stable mergers do not lead to more eﬃciency and may even lead to eﬃciency losses. These
mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming
that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger will be eﬀectively realised. Moreover, the paper
oﬀers a possible explanation for merger failures.
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1 Introduction
Mergers are common practice in many markets and their dynamics, as well as their advantages
and disadvantages, are often discussed. Especially the analysis of horizontal mergers and their
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possible eﬃciency gains have been important topics in recent years (European Commission
Report [5]). Economic merger theory shows that a merger can reduce welfare by increasing
market power but that it can also create eﬃciency gains in a variety of ways, thereby making
the merger possibly welfare enhancing (see Röller et al. [15] for an overview).
However, many analysts suspect that there are more factors in play. Eﬃciency gains of
mergers should not be taken for granted. The possibility that a merged firm may become
more eﬃcient does not mean that these gains will be actually realised as is now widely assumed
in the economics literature. This is because of two related factors. First, becoming more
eﬃcient requires investment and is thus a strategic decision. Second, a newly merged firm
brings together diﬀerent corporate cultures, which can lead to conflict and therefore possibly
less investment.1
This paper broadens the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains in concentrated
markets. In line with Rajan & Zingales [13], we think it is realistic to claim that the manager
and not the owner is in control of many decisions that aﬀect a firm’s eﬃciency.2 The aim is
to shed more light on how merger and investment decisions interact, and look how the internal
organization of firms has an influence on these interactions. This approach facilitates the
understanding of why some mergers may fail to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen.
We construct a model of endogenous mergers with three managers. Managers choose whom
to form partnerships while anticipating a share of the future revenues. Each manager controls
some non-transferable resources, such as organizational or managerial capacities, that determine
production costs. They have to decide whether to supply them (invest) at a private cost before
the formed firms compete in the product market à la Cournot. We assume that when managers
are together, the resources of the new formed firm add up the resources that the participating
managers control.3 This allows us to take into account economies of scale.4
1A recent example can be found in the creation of Corus in 1999. The Anglo-Dutch group became the third-
biggest steel company in the world, but its value has dramatically come down. The Economist (March 15th 2003)
argues that the error was that Corus “failed to construct a workable model for its internal management, choosing
instead to paper over the diﬀerences between the English and the Dutch systems.”
2Rajan & Zingales [13] say that the amount of surplus that a manager gets from the control of residual rights
is often more contingent on him making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from ownership.
Hence, access to the resources of the firm can be a better mechanism to describe power than ownership. Of
course the agent who owns and uses the assets of the firm can be the same person.
3This argument is valid for all cases where the resources are complementary. The same idea is found in Bloch
[2] Goyal & Moraga-González [7], where eﬀorts in R&D induce a higher spillover if firms are in a joint venture.
4A recent literature on endogenous coalition formation deals with eﬃciency gains (e.g. Belleflamme [1], Bloch
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Currently all discussions on mergers are limited to exogenous eﬃciencies while the outcomes
and policy recommendations could be diﬀerent when considering investment in a more eﬃcient
technology as a choice variable. In a study for the European Commission, Röller et al. [16]
lament the lack of economic knowledge about the interaction of merger and investment decisions:
“It is not clear how one should treat the endogenous scale economies that are an alienable aspect
of concentrated industries”.
Forging a common corporate culture out of two or more disparate ones can be costly and
can even lead to less eﬃcient and less profitable firms. Surprisingly enough, concepts such as
power and conflict within the firm are often forgotten in the economics literature when looking
at merger decisions, despite evidence indicating that they play a major role (Seabright [18]).
We consider the possibility that, after a merger, managers do not work in the interest of the
firm but in their own.5 It is often said that the motivation of managers to work together in the
interest of the firm comes from team spirit and trust in each other (Kandel & Lazear [11]). But,
this is exactly what we believe is lacking in a merged firm. Since it is not always possible to
write complete contracts in a firm and the privately costly investment is ex ante not verifiable,
the lack of trust is leading to a free riding problem. Thus, conflict in our model makes that each
manager in a firm invests only when it is privately beneficial to do so. Internal problems may
therefore arise, driven by a lack of trust and informational externalities caused by the inability
to identify individual contributions (Holmström [9]).
Two extreme cases are considered. First, we analyse the situation where managers coop-
erate inside the firm when deciding on investment. Equivalently, contracts are assumed to be
complete. This setup permits us to investigate what happens when investment is a decision
variable and allows us to compare with the realised eﬃciency gains when managers do not co-
operate within the firm. It is found that if managers inside a firm cooperate, they have more
incentives to do so in a merged firm because of potential economies of scale, but only when it is
profitable. In other words, even when there is no internal conflict, a potential merger may not
[2] and Yi [19]), but also these authors model eﬃciency gains as exogenous. Yi [20] lets firms decide on their
investment in R&D, but the level of product market collusion is determined by a social planner.
5All managers in our model stay in the merged firm and keep control over part of the assets. One could claim
that in a merger only one manager comes to control all the assets. But this would eliminate all internal problems
and is normally not observed in reality. Probably it would be better to model a merger not as a conflict between
single managers, but as a lack of trust between the diﬀerent teams that now have to work together. We think
that our way of modelling is a good approximation of this idea, assuming that each manager is the boss of his
team and making all strategic decisions.
3
necessarily be more eﬃcient. The second scenario considers a situation where the managers do
not trust each other. Contracts are not complete and suboptimal investment decisions are likely
to occur (Holmström [8]). We find that the conflict of interests within the firm can dominate
the possible economies of scale, making a larger merged firm invest less. A merger can therefore
even be a less eﬃcient firm than non-merged firms.6
These equilibrium investment decisions have an impact on the stability of industry structures.
When looking at which mergers will eﬀectively materialise, we find for cooperating managers
inside the firm a result in the spirit of Salant et al. [17]. If all managers simultaneously can
choose to go to the monopoly industry structure, they will do so. This is possible with our merger
stability concept in which managers can anticipate the reaction of the others. Thus, when
managers cooperate at the investment-decision level, the only stable structure is the monopoly.
This complete market concentration does not necessarily lead to a more eﬃcient production.
For non-cooperating managers, not only the monopoly structure but the duopoly and triopoly
are possible stable outcomes. Two conclusions follow. First, conflict within the firm can lead
to less market concentration, even when modelling mergers as the potentially more eﬃcient
firms. This is the case when duopoly or triopoly are stable, whereas without conflict the
monopoly was always stable. Second, when there will indeed be mergers in equilibrium, these
merged firms are sometimes to be found less eﬃcient. This happens when -despite the internal
conflict- it is optimal to merge, but -because of more internal conflict and aggressive investment
of competitors- managers invest less in the larger merged firms.
Welfare analysis shows that the stable industry structure is too concentrated from a social
point of view for both scenarios when merged firms do not become more eﬃcient. A welfare
comparison of the stable structures in the no-conflict and conflict situation indicates that the
scenario where managers do not trust each other is always equal or inferior to the case where
managers cooperate internally. The cases where the non-cooperating managers do not merge,
-leading to less market power and thus better for consumers- are dominated by the loss in
6The set-up of the model and sequence of events is in the same philosophy as Espinosa & Macho-Stadler [6],
Rajan & Zingales [13] and Goyal & Moraga-González [7]. In Espinosa and Macho-Stadler [6], partners group into
firms in a sequential way, and in the second stage firms compete à la Cournot with a moral hazard problem inside
the firms when deciding upon production. In Rajan & Zingales [13], an asset owner chooses how many managers
can have access to the assets. The managers who receive access choose their non-contractible investment. In
Goyal & Moraga-González [7], firms decide to participate in R&D networks. Given a collaboration network,
each firm chooses a non-contractible investment which defines the cost of production and all firms individually
compete à la Cournot afterwards.
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eﬃciency, which is worse for consumers.
These results show that interactions between what is happening inside and outside firms is
important in determining the boundaries and eﬃciency levels of a firm. A regulator should take
into account that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger may not be realised, what could change
the decision for approval of this merger as we see when analysing social welfare. Possibly there
has to be given also more attention to lack of trust within firms. Our model suggests that
internal conflict not only harms firms, but also consumers and therefore total welfare. We give
as well an explanation for merger failures. When firms decide to go together, the organisational
diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If managers do not correctly foresee the
internal problems, the new firm may not be profitable and thus resulting in a failue.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present
the solution of the diﬀerent stages of the model. Section 6 and section 7 discuss respectively
welfare issues and some extensions of the model. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a situation where three managers have to decide on their productive organisation.
In a first stage, managers decide on the industry structure (Ω) and choose whether to set up
their own firm or join forces with other managers. Three industry structures can arise. We
denote each manager in a monopoly as m and in a triopoly as t. In the duopoly structure, the
two managers that merge are denoted by i (‘insider’) whereas the remaining manager is denoted
as o (‘outsider’). In the second stage, each manager decides to which extent he invests -at a
cost- to reduce production costs. In the first scenario, there is no internal conflict within a firm.
Equivalently, all decisions are verifiable and managers behave in the interest of the firm to which
they belong. In the second case, their is no control on which managers invest and because of
a lack of trust managers do what is best for them individually. In the third stage the formed
firms compete à la Cournot.7
To solve the model we proceed by backward induction. We first solve the third stage of the
game, where firms simultaneously decide their production level. We consider an homogeneous
market with a linear demand, P (Q) = a−Q, where a is a positive constant measuring the size
7 It is in the interest of all the managers in the same firm to cooperate in the product market. This is because
we do not assume that there is an individual cost attached to producing. For a partnership formation model
where production is costly for each manager, see Espinosa & Macho-Stadler [6].
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of the market and Q =
P
ω∈Ω
qω is the total production, with qω the production of firm w.
Anticipating the Nash equilibrium in outputs, managers take investment decisions simulta-
neously. The constant marginal cost of firm ω, ω ∈ Ω, will be denoted by sω, and consists in
common marginal cost, S, reduced by the investment of the managers within each firm:
sω = S −
X
j∈ω
Ij , (1)
where Ij represents investment by manager j in firm ω. The more managers in the firm, the
more possibility to lower the costs of production, so there are possibilities for economies of scale
in investment. Manager j chooses Ij in the set {0, k}. Parameter k can be interpreted as the
magnitude that investment brings in lowering the production costs of the firm.8 We assume that
in equilibrium all firms in all industry structures produce a non-negative quantity and therefore
k ∈ [0, a−S2 ]. The cost of an investment Ij is denoted by Cj (Ij), where Cj (0) = 0 and Cj (k) = c.
In the first stage, the merger stage, managers decide on forming a firm alone or together
with other managers. We assume firstly that mangers share profits equally, and discuss later
that the results would not change qualitatively if they decide on the sharing rule. An industry
structure is stable if no manager or group of managers has an incentive to deviate and form a
diﬀerent firm. The payoﬀ of the formed firm depends on the organisation of the other managers.
Hence, in evaluating a possible deviation, managers must make a prediction of what the other
managers will do. We adopt the view that the most reasonable prediction when deciding upon
a deviation is that the remaining managers will choose the best strategy possible.
Definition 1 An industry structure Ω is stable if there is no profitable deviation by a group of
managers to form another firm, considering that the remaining managers would choose to form
firms to maximise their payoﬀ.
This analysis is relatively simple when considering three managers. When the group con-
sidering a deviation is the three-managers firm, we only have to check if this is a profitable
deviation since there are no remaining managers. When two managers deviate, the optimal re-
action by the third manager is trivially to stay alone. Finally, when only one manager deviates,
the remaining two may choose optimally either to go together or to split apart.
8Note that an alternative approach is to assume that the investment belongs to an interval [0, k] . Given
the linearity of the model, this would be equivalent to the assumption I ∈ {0, k} since the optimal decision on
investment is always a corner solution.
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When considering a deviation, managers are anticipating the investment outcome in the sec-
ond stage. When there are multiple Nash equilibria in the investment stage, they have to make a
prediction about what will occur as investment outcome. We adopt the view that managers are
optimistic: when considering a deviation, they predict the investment Nash equilibrium which
is most beneficial in terms of profits.9
3 Product market competition (3rd Stage)
Assume that an industry structure Ω with r firms has been formed at stage 1 and the investments
made in stage 2 imply costs sυ, for all v ∈ Ω. Then each firm w ∈ Ω maximizes its profits:
max
qω
("
a−
X
υ∈Ω
qυ
#
qω − sωqω
)
.
The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game leads firm ω ∈ Ω to produce
qω =
Ã
a+
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
sυ − rsω
!
(r + 1) =
Ã
a− S −
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
Iυ + rIω
!
(r + 1) .
Without loss of generality we assume a− S = 1. The equilibrium (gross) profit for firm ω is
Πω =
Ã
1−
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
Iυ + rIω
!2
(r + 1)2
. (2)
4 Endogenous Investment (2nd stage)
In this section we analyse the investment decision for managers as a function of the market
structure and the internal commitment. Let us first set the terminology we use. One of
the main aims of the paper is to investigate whether a merger leads to more eﬃciency. We
say that there are eﬃciency gains when a merged firm produces at a lower marginal cost than
9This approach has been used by other authors. Diamantoudi [4] analyses the endogenous formation of
coalitions using the concept of ‘binding agreements’ when there are multiple Nash equilibria and considers diﬀerent
behavioral assumptions, among others the optimistic approach. A similar concept for matching markets has been
defined by Demange & Gale [3]. The optimistic view is very demanding in terms of stability since it may induce
many deviations. However, in our model with three managers, stability is reached for almost all parameter
combinations and this stability concept reduces the number of stable outcomes and allows us to concentrate on
‘very’ stable industry outcomes.
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would separate entities do. This lowering in marginal costs is due to a higher investment of the
managers present in the firm.
Definition 2 A merger implies eﬃciency gains when the merged firm has lower production
costs. These lower production costs are realised because of a higher investment activity of the
managers in the merged firm.
We consider two extreme cases of internal organisation. First, we discuss the scenario where
managers cooperate fully within the firm. This results in the best possible situation for the
managers (first best situation). Second, the internal conflict case is looked at.
4.1 No Internal Conflict
If investment is a cooperative decision within the firm, the profit for a manager j in firm ω ∈ Ω
with |ω| managers is
πjω =
1
|ω|Πω −
1
|ω|
X
l∈ω
Cl . (3)
Note that maximizing (3) is equivalent to maximizing the (net) profits of the firm. Investment
of diﬀerent firms must form a Nash equilibrium.
It is intuitive enough that costs and gains of investment play a major role in what happens
in equilibrium and our analysis is done in function of these two parameters. But apart from
costs and gains, the amount in which firms will decide to reduce production costs depends (i) on
the size of the firms, i.e. the number of managers in the firm, and (ii), on the competition level.
First, the larger a firm is, the more incentives to invest. Since managers in the same firm are
cooperating, they will be able to exploit the economies of scale. Second, a firm may want to
invest for strategic reasons. Investment activities are strategic substitutes across firms and more
investment implies later on a better position in the production phase vis à vis the competitors.
Therefore, the more competitors in the market, the more incentives a manager has to invest.
This means that the scale eﬀect and strategic eﬀect go in opposite directions.10 Proposition
1 states the previous intuition as a function of the parameters of the model. Remark that we
10This is of course an immediate consequence of our model. The number of managers in the market is fixed,
so if there are more managers inside the firm -i.e. the firm is larger- there are less managers outside the firm -ie.
there are less competitors. However, it seems natural to assume that, given a certain industry, larger firms and
a more concentrated market go together, even if there would be free entry.
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state the eﬃciency gains in the conditional state. At this stage we do not know yet which
mergers are going to take place if any.
Proposition 1 When managers cooperate, for costs/gains of investment going from low to
high, we can distinguish four regions:
(A) All managers invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(B) Managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly invest, but single-manager firms may
not. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(C) Managers that set up a firm alone do not invest. Either the monopolists or the insiders
invest. There exist therefore always a merger that would lead to eﬃciency gains, but not any
merger would lead to an eﬃciency gain.
(D) Nobody invests. No merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
The regions defined in Proposition 1 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted
in Figure 1.11 When the investment is free (i.e., c = 0), any firm will invest in reducing
production costs (region A). On the contrary, when the investment is extremely expensive as
compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal decision will be not to invest (region D).
For intermediate ranges of costs/gains of investment, the scale and strategic issues determine who
invests. Region B shows that the first managers to give up investing are the one-manager firms,
because the scale event is strongest: the smallest firms loose first their incentives. In region
C, both eﬀects can dominate. In region C1, only monopolists invest because the scale eﬀect
dominates. In region C2, the strategic motive is more important and the insiders (competing
in the duopoly) invest whereas the monopolists do not. Note that still, within the duopoly,
the insiders have more incentives to invest than the outsider because of the scale eﬀect. In our
model the strategic eﬀects are almost always inferior to the scale eﬀects when there is no internal
conflict.
[Place Figure 1 approximately here]
Multiple investment equilibria may exist. The optimal decision for a monopoly and duopoly
is always unique. In the triopoly the type of equilibrium is unique but it is not always clear
which manager invests in equilibrium. There are three equilibria of the type ((k)(k)(0)) where
two managers invest, I = k, and the third does not. In another region of the parameters there
11Note that the normalisation a − S = 1 implies that k ∈ [0, 1/2] in order to have all firms producing in
equilibrium. Without the normalisation, the axes in Figure 1 would have been: ka−S and
c
a−S . Comparative
statics with respect to (a− S) would simply expand or contract the Figure.
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exist three Nash equilibria where the investment decisions take the form ((k)(0)(0)). This is
because managers are ex-ante symmetric and we cannot say who invests and who not. This is
not important in the investment stage, since we only need to know what happens in equilibrium,
independent on which person does what.
4.2 Internal Conflict
We now solve the situation where managers within the firm do not cooperate when taking
investment decisions. Managers choose again their investment as a function of the gains this
investment implies for the profits of the firm to which they belong. But the cost of investing is
not shared by the whole firm, the managers individually have to bear this cost and a free riding
problem might arise. The profit for a manager j in firm ω ∈ Ω with |ω| managers is
πjω =
1
|ω|Πω − Cj . (4)
As in the first best case, the amount in which firms decide to reduce production costs depends
(i) on the size of the firms and (ii), on the competition structure. However, the issues are not
as clear cut anymore. If a firm is larger, there are still more chances to exploit the economies
of scale. But also the possibility for internal conflict grows. In a larger firm each manager
receives a smaller share of the gross profits induced by his individually costly investment. The
eﬀect of the size of a firm on the incentives to invest can go both ways. Whereas for low costs
with respect to gains of investment economies of scale dominates, conflict becomes rapidly more
important as costs/gains rise. Thus, managers in larger firms loose much faster their incentives
to invest than in the case without conflict. The strategic event still induces managers in a less
concentrated market to invest more. It is therefore easy to understand that both the conflict
and strategic eﬀect go in the same direction. When conflict is strong, managers in smaller
firms -and therefore also facing more competitors- have more incentives to invest. Proposition
2 states the previous intuition as a function of the parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 When managers do not cooperate inside the firm, for costs/gains of investment
going from low to high, we can distinguish four regions:
(E) Managers in a monopoly and insiders invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(F) Managers in a monopoly never invest and there is always an equilibrium in which insiders
invest. In the equilibrium where insiders invest, a merger towards duopoly would imply eﬃciency
gains. A merger towards monopoly would mean an eﬃciency loss.
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(G) Managers in the monopoly and insiders never invest, but there exists always a single-
manager firm that does. Any merger would imply eﬃciency losses.
(H) Nobody invests. No merger leads to eﬃciency gains or eﬃciency losses.
The regions defined in Proposition 2 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted in
Figure 2. In region E where the investment is close to free, any firm invests. Within this region
conflict is not important, and the scale eﬀect dominates, implying that the largest firms in the
market have most incentives to invest. For costs/gains of investment rising, the conflict issue,
reinforced by the strategic eﬀect, starts interfering with scale and managers in the monopoly stop
investing (region F1). Further on, the conflict situation becomes more and more important,
making either the insiders or the outsider in duopoly invest (region F2). The conflict eﬀect
becomes finally always dominant and insiders never invest anymore (region G). Finally, when
the investment is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal
decision for all managers will be not to invest (region H).
[Place Figure 2 approximately here]
What does this imply for the eﬃciency gains? As long as the monopolist invests, any merger
leads to a more eﬃcient firm. From the moment that managers in the monopoly do not invest
and other managers still do, a merger towards monopoly leads to eﬃciency losses. When also
the insiders stop investing and the one-manager firm still does, any merger leads to eﬃciency
losses. Finally, when nobody invests, a merger does not lead to any eﬃciency changes.
Summarising the results obtained for both scenarios, some mergers may induce eﬃciency
gains but for this to be true a necessary condition is that the cost of the investment compared
to the gains are low enough. If the internal conflict is important, a merger may even imply
eﬃciency losses.
5 Stable market structures (1st stage)
Managers decide in the first stage to stay alone or go together with other managers, anticipat-
ing the investment decisions and competition in the market. We analyse the stable industry
structures. We consider first the situation with no internal conflict.
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5.1 No Internal Conflict
When managers cooperate within the firms, larger firms tend to invest more and tend to be
more profitable. This makes it naturally more interesting for managers to merge. The next
proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 3 When there is no internal conflict within firms, the monopoly is the only stable
structure. No stable structure exists for a region where costs and gains of investment are very
low.
The results stated in Proposition 3 are represented in Figure 3. Two diﬀerent processes
lead the monopoly to be the only stable outcome. The first takes place because managers are
able to avoid the classical outsider-problem. If a managers tries to free-ride on the others by
deviating, the other two optimally split apart, making the deviation unprofitable.12 The other
process leads managers very naturally towards the monopoly outcome, because any merger is
profitable for all managers.
When the cost of investment is high with respect to its gains (region D in the corresponding
Figure 1), managers do not invest and the only motive for merging is having more market
power. Managers reach thus the monopoly through the first process. However, when the
cost of investment is low with respect to its gains (region A), managers always prefer to invest
because of economies of scale. Merged entities have therefore lower production costs, leading in
general to more incentives to merge than when nobody invests. This situation is similar to the
situation described in Perry & Porter [12], where the merged firm has lower production costs
than either of the forming firms.13 In regions B and C, either the first or the second process
makes the monopoly the only stable outcome.
[Place Figure 3 approximately here]
12The outsider-problem occurs when it is beneficial for all to merge towards monopoly, but it is even better to
be the outsider in duopoly. This is the situation in Salant et al. [17]. In their model, where there are no scale
economies, merging is beneficial if the number of outsiders is low and the merging firms represent at least 80% of
the total market. In our three-firm case this threshold implies the merger towards monopoly.
13To be complete, we have to distinguish three diﬀerent cases when all managers invest. First, for a high
enough eﬃciency gain (a high enough k), the monopoly naturally arises. For intermediate gains, managers still
prefer to be an outsider over being in a monopoly, but now the other two will prefer to stay together over being
alone. There will be therefore continuously a duopoly, but the formed firms are not stable. When gains are low,
only the merger towards monopoly is profitable and the reasoning is the same as in the case of no investment.
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5.2 Internal Conflict
We present the stable mergers when conflict within firms happens. For the sake of presentation,
we show the results separately for the four regions identified in Proposition 2. Consider first
the case corresponding to Proposition 2(E) where the cost of investment is low with respect to
its gains, making monopolists and insiders always invest.
Proposition 4 When there is internal conflict within firms and investment costs/gains are low
(monopolists and insiders always invest), the monopoly is the only stable structure.
When managers always prefer to invest, entities merge towards monopoly for exactly the
same reasons as when managers always invest in the no-conflict situation. These results are
depicted in the lower part of Figure 4 (equivalent to region E of Figure 2).
[Place Figure 4 approximately here]
The case corresponding to Proposition 2(F ) is where the conflict eﬀect starts interfering
with the scale eﬀect, making the monopoly never investing and there is always an equilibrium
in which insiders invest.
Proposition 5 When there is internal conflict within firms and costs/gains of investment are
intermediate (monopolists never invest and insiders might invest),
(a) If in equilibrium the insiders always invest, the duopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable
industry structure.
(b) If in equilibrium either insiders or the outsider invest, the duopoly is the only stable structure.
Whenever the gains are high, the duopoly in which the insiders invest is the stable industry
structure. The conflict eﬀect induces the monopoly not to invest, but it is still not dominating
in the two-player firm, making the insiders in the duopoly the best oﬀ (See intermediate part
of Figure 4, corresponding to region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). In addition, insiders do not have
incentives to split apart: the gains are high enough to prevent them to deviate to triopoly.
Hence, duopoly is the stable market structure.14 Insiders obtain here a higher profit than
14 In case (b), the investment Nash equilibrium in duopoly is not unique. There is an equilibrium where only
the insiders invest and a second where only the outsider invests. When two managers deviate, they are optimistic
and expect that in the duopoly structure the Nash equilibrium will be such that they will invest and the outsider
will not. They obtain more under this market structure than under triopoly and hence the triopoly is not stable.
When deviating from monopoly, the outsider being optimistic, assumes that the final equilibrium is the one in
which he invests. However, when the outsider invests, the insiders prefer to break up and to deviate towards
triopoly and we have no stability. For the same reason, the outsider-investing duopoly is not stable.
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monopolists. This is an important eﬀect that appears with conflict. When there is no internal
conflict, monopoly is always superior to being an insider in duopoly.
When gains are lower and costs of investment higher, the stability arguments are again the
same as the situation where all managers invest in no-conflict (its three cases also appear here,
see footnote 14), but there is an important diﬀerence. Here the monopoly does not invest.
However, even if in this region the monopoly does not invest, the reduction in competition and
the lower benefits from investment make the monopoly substantially more beneficial and makes
it the only stable industry structure (See region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). A merger to monopoly
induces here eﬃciency losses.
When costs are high with respect to gains, we are in Proposition 2(G) and 2(H). The
conflict eﬀect becomes always dominant and neither monopolists nor insiders invest. When
the investment is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal
decision for all managers will be not to invest.
Proposition 6 When there is internal conflict within firms and costs/gains of investment are
high (only single-manager firms might invest).
(a) If only one triopolist invests, the triopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable industry
structure.
(b) Otherwise, only the monopoly can be a stable industry structure.
When only one triopolist invests and gains from investment are high enough, it is clear that
the triopoly will be the only stable industry structure.15 In the other cases, monopoly is stable
for the same reasons as in region D in Proposition 3.
When managers do not trust each other in a newly merged firm, they are less willing to
invest, making in turn a merger sometimes unprofitable. Thus, internal conflict generates less
mergers, resulting in a completely or partly deconcentrated industry structure. This indicates
that even when numerous factors would lead to monopolisation, managers decide not to merge
because of a lack of trust. The monopolisation factors are twofold in our model: possible
economies of scale and having more market power. Mergers however still occur because of the
monopolisation factors, but the lack of trust makes managers often not investing and mergers
15This triopolist does not want to merge with other managers because of the reinforcing conflict and strategic
eﬀects. The other two triopolists do not want to go together either. In a duopoly, the non-investing insiders are
in a disadvantage with respect to the investing outsider and moreover, they have to share profits.
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lead in this case always to eﬃciency losses.16
In the next section we give, based on our model, a possible explanation for merger failures.
6 Merger Failures
If managers cannot perfectly foresee whether there will be internal conflict within the merged
firm, it is possible that wrong merger decisions are taken. Suppose that ex-ante managers merge
because they expect a priori that there will be no internal conflict, but conflict does arise later
on. This misjudgement might lead to a merger failure (less profits in merger than in no-merger).
We have indeed found cases where the monopoly is stable under no conflict (Section 5.1) but
where in a conflict situation, profits are higher with a lower market concentration (Section 5.2),
meaning that because of not foreseeing this conflict, managers have erronously merged.
A similar argument applies when managers are rational but there exists uncertainty about
the possibility of internal conflict. Let us assume that ex post -in the investment stage- we are
in one of our two extreme cases (no conflict at all or total conflict), but ex ante -in the merger
stage- managers cannot perfectly foresee what is going to happen. Thus, managers decide upon
merging given their expectations:
Pr(Conflict) = α
Pr(NoConflict) = 1− α.
Once mergers have occurred, managers realise in which case they are and investment decisions
are as described in Section 4. We omit the derivation of the stable structures, but the procedure
is similar to the two cases presented before.17 The stable market structures are obtained by
calculating with expected profits and are defined by the investment gains (k), investment costs
(c) and expectations (α). For illustrating purposes, we depict in Figure 5 the stability results
for the case k = 1/2.
[Place Figure 5 approximately here]
16Our stability concept has an important role in obtaining monopolisation as a stable industry structure. This
equilibrium does not arise in some other merger games. For example, in a model where acquisitions are made
through a bidding game, Kamien and Zang [10] show that monopoly cannot be an equilibrium while making no
acquisition at all always is. This occurs because when deviating, a manager in their model assumes that the
others will not change their strategy, which is possible in our model.
17Calculations are available upon request.
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When managers merge to monopoly because they expect the merger to be profitable because
the risk of internal conflict is suﬃciently low, but there arises a conflict later, there are cases
where triopoly or duopoly would have been better choices.18
7 Welfare
In this section we analyse what would be the socially optimal market structure in each situation
(with and without internal conflict) and compare these with the obtained stable outcomes. Total
welfare is defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus:
W = Q
2
2
+
X
j=1,2,3
πj .
For the consumers, the best solution is where total industry production is highest. Total
production is increasing in the level of competition and in firms’ eﬃciency. For both scenarios,
when no firm or only the triopolists invest and there are therefore no eﬃciency gains in merging,
production is maximised in the triopoly industry structure. When the monopolists invest and
the eﬃciency gains are important, monopoly is optimal for consumers because the eﬃciency
gains outweigh the market power eﬀects. Duopoly can be output maximising, mostly in the
conflict case when insiders in duopoly invest, but managers in the monopoly not.
Looking at the producer surplus, if managers cooperate internally the optimum is always
the monopoly. Monopolists are able to replicate or do better what managers do in any other
market structure. For non-cooperating managers, total market concentration may not be profit
enhancing since conflict may make it impossible for monopolists to replicate what smaller firms
do. For example, when the monopolist does not invest but insiders do, it is better to be an
insider than a monopolist: the gains in eﬃciency are higher than the loss of the lower market
power. Figure 6 and 7 present the social optimum for both scenarios. In both cases, when
costs/gains of investment are low consumers and producers interests coincide and the eﬃcent
monopoly is preﬀered. For cost/gains high, it is unlikely that all managers invest and both
groups have opposite interests, but consumer surplus dominates in determining what is best for
total welfare and the triopoly structure maximises total welfare. For intermediate cost/gains
duopoly can be the social optimum.
18The opposite can also be true. If managers have a priori pessimistic expectations about the degree of internal
conflict and choose not to merge, it may well be ex post that a merger would have been profitable.
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[Place Figure 6 and 7 approximately here]
In comparing the social outcomes (Figures 6 and 7) with the stable industries (Figures 3 and
4), it is clear that when there are important eﬃciency gains in mergers, the stable outcome is
also socially optimal. When the eﬃciencies are less important, stable market structures are not
welfare maximising.
We also see that it is always as good or better for a society when managers cooperate inside
the firm. This is of course because investment is more often done, leading to more eﬃcient
firms and thus more production. The non-cooperating managers have sometimes less market
power in a stable structure, a good thing for consumers, but this coincides always with also less
eﬃcient firms, and the latter eﬀect dominates.
We can derive two main conclusions from the welfare analysis. First, when modelling
investment as a decision variable, it becomes clear that where stable mergers would be normally
good for the total welfare if the -exogenous- eﬃciency gains are high enough, this is not true
anymore, because often merging managers prefer not to invest, even when they are internally
cooperating. Second, internal conflict might not only be bad for the managers, but also for
consumers, because it is leading to less eﬃciency and -oﬀsetting the lower market power eﬀect-
to less production.
8 Discussion
In this section we discuss some assumptions of the model. We constructed a model of endoge-
nous mergers in a concentrated market with only three managers. We believe that the main
eﬀects present would not change in situations with more than three managers. However, with
endogenous investment and our stability concept, this analysis would be extremely complex.
We have chosen for simplicity to present throughout the paper the case where the sharing
rule is exogenous. Our results qualitatively remain unchanged in a model where the managers
optimally decide upon the sharing of the profits when the firm is formed. Note first that it seems
natural to assume that when managers are ex ante identical, all the managers in the same firm
have to receive ex post the same payoﬀ.19 Second, the optimal agreement in the conflict case has
to maximise the firm’s profits taking into account the incentives that this agreement provides.
19Ray & Vohra [14] have indeed proven that in a sequential coalition formation game where players are identical
this is optimal.
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Hence, whether the managers receive their payoﬀ via a fixed fee and/or as a percentage of the
joint profit determines the incentives to invest. When all the parameter combinations are such
that agreeing on an equal sharing rule of the profits induces the same investment decision as
in the non-conflict case, this sharing rule is optimal. When the equal sharing does not give
incentives in a multi-manager firm, better investment incentives can be obtained by increasing
the percentage of the profits to some managers and compensate the others via a fixed fee. When
managers set up the optimal payment scheme, the diﬀerences between the conflict and no conflict
case are smaller because in conflict the investment levels decrease now more gradually.
We have considered two extreme situations in terms of conflict within firms. Realistically,
there are diﬀerent levels of conflict where in the firm managers may commit on some investments
and may not on others. If β is the degree of conflict, managers’ profits are πjω = 1|ω|Πω −³
βCj + (1− β) 1|ω|
P
l∈ω Cl
´
. Again, while having an additional parameter, the analysis would
yield similar results.
Finally, we have adopted the view that when deviating, managers are optimistic in the sense
that they predict the prevailing equilibrium in investment to be the one in which their profits
are highest. This assumption reduces the set of stable market structures, making in some cases
the set empty. If managers were pessimistic and hence less willing to deviate, while the set of
empty structures may be smaller, we might have situations with multiple stable structures.
9 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to broaden the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains
in concentrated markets, including investment as a strategic variable and allowing for a lack of
trust within the firm. This approach facilitates the understanding of why some mergers may
fail to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen. Other merger models take investment to
be exogenous and treat the firm as a black box, but as Holmström [9] points out, “we cannot
claim to fully understand either the internal organisation of firms or the operation in markets
by studying them in isolation”.
We construct an endogenous merger formation model with three managers simultaneously
taking merger decisions. Internal problems may arise on the moment where managers decide
on investing. The lack of trust and inability to identify individual contributions may result in
free-riding problems and suboptimal decisions.
We find indeed that even when allowing a merger to be potentially more eﬃcient -i.e., a
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larger firm can produce at a lower cost when having taken the necessary investment decisions-
managers in a merged firm do not necessarily want this to happen. People in a larger firm have
eﬀectively more incentives to invest because of economies of scale, but only do so when this is
profitable. The problems due to a lack of trust -becoming bigger in a larger firm- can even
oﬀset the possible economies of scale thereby making a merged firm less eﬃcient. In a model
of strategic R&D networks with Cournot competition in later stage, Goyal & Moraga-González
[7] also find that when R&D is unilaterally chosen, the level of R&D is decreasing in the size of
the R&D network.
When managers cooperate internally, we find a complete market concentration to be the only
stable outcome. Managers can simultaneously decide together and are able to reach what is for
them the best possible industry structure (this is a result similar in the spirit of Salant et al.
[17]). With internal conflict, not only monopoly, but only less concentrated market structures
and even a completely defragmentated industry is possible in equilibrium.
Therefore, when managers in the same firm trust each other, all merge, but this merged firm
is not necessarily more eﬃcient than would be a smaller firm. When managers do not cooperate
internally, they may decide not to merge, because of a too high conflict. If they still decide to
merge, they may invest less than the smaller firms. Whenever a merger is not leading to more
eﬃciency, a move towards more market concentration is leading to lower welfare. Moreover,
the lack of trust seems not only to lead to suboptimal outcomes for the managers, but also from
a social point of view: the consumers loose more from the loss in eﬃciency than they gain due
to a lower market power of the firms.
With our results, we want to point out that the recent documents on the “eﬃciency defence
of mergers” (see European Commission Report [5]) are forgetting some essential elements. A
regulator should not assume that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger will be realised, which could
change the decision for approval of this merger. Also, although probably not a generalisable
result, the lack of trust in recently merged firms may be important not only for managers, but
could also be bad for total welfare, indicating that these issues are as well important for policy
makers. Finally, our model also gives an explanation for merger failures. When firms decide
to go together, the organisational diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If
managers do not correctly foresee internal problems, they merge while this new entity is not
profitable and resulting thus in a failure.
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10 Appendix
In this section we present the explicit expressions for the diﬀerent cases in the propositions
and their proofs. The proofs are given following a series of lemmas. We denote for simplicity
Πmj the (gross) profits for each manager in monopoly when j managers invest; Πij,l and Πol,j
the (gross) profits for each insider and outsider manager, respectively, when j insiders and l
outsiders invests; and Πt1,j and Π
t
0,j the (gross) profits for each triopolist when he invests and
when he does not, respectively, in the case the other j triopolists invest (j = 0, 1, 2). Similarly
we denote πm, πi, πoand πt the ‘net’ profits for each monopolist, insider, outsider and triopolist.
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Within each firm, it is always always optimal for the managers to choose a corner solution, where
none of them invests or all of them do. Managers in a monopoly invest if and only if c ≤ cm
where cm is implicitly defined by Πm3 − cm = Πm0 . When there is competition, firms condition
their investment decisions to those of the rivals. In a duopoly, insiders’ decision depends on the
decision of the outsider and vice versa. The insiders invest if c ≤ ci1 and if c ≤ ci0 depending,
respectively, whether the outsider invest or not, where Πi2,1 − ci1 = Πi0,1 and Πi2,0 − ci0 = Πi0,0.
Similarly, the outsider invest if c ≤ co2 and if c ≤ co0 depending, respectively, whether the insiders
invest or not, where Πo1,2 − co2 = Πo0,2 and Πi1,0 − co0 = Πo0,0. Finally, each triopolist invests if
c ≤ ctj , where Πt1,j − ctj = Πt0,j .
Lemma 1 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: ct2 < ct1 < ct0 < ci; co < ci; ct0 < cm and
co < cm where for simplicity we denote ci ≡ ci0 and co ≡ co2.
Proof. By definition, the cutoﬀ points for the triopolists are ct2 =
3k(2−k)
16 , ct1 =
3k(2+k)
16 and
ct0 =
3k(2+3k)
16 . In a duopoly, ci1 =
4k(1+k)
9 , ci0 =
4k(1+2k)
9 , co2 =
4k(1−k)
9 and co0 =
4k(1+k)
9 . Notice
that co0 is not relevant. In the region where the outsider does invest only if the insiders do not
(co2 < c < co0), the latter always invest (ci0 > ci1 = co0). Similarly, ci1 is not relevant because when
the insiders would stop investing if the outsider invested, the latter never invests. Finally, in a
monopoly, cm = k(2+3k)4 . The ordering follows from straightforward algebra.
The following Lemma characterizes the four diﬀerent regions in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ min{co, ct2} all managers in all firms invest.
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b) If min{co, ct2} < c ≤ min{ci, cm}, managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly
invest but single-manager firms may not.
c) If min{ci, cm} < c ≤ max{ci, cm}, either the insiders or the monopolists invest while the
rest never does. If k ≤ 25 we have that ci ≤ cm and only the monopolists invest whereas if k >
2
5
we have that ci > cm and only the insiders invest.
d) If c > max{ci, cm}, no manager invests.
Proof. a) and d) From Lemma 1, if c ≤ min{co, ct2} all the cutoﬀs are above and hence all firms
invest whereas if c > max{ci, cm} all the cutoﬀs are below and hence no manager invests.
b) In this region, by definition, the insiders and the monopolists invest. Within the region,
as c increases the single-manager firms stop investing gradually (in diﬀerent order depending on
k).
c) From Lemma 1 the cutoﬀs for all single-manager firms are below and hence they never
invest. Straightforward algebra shows that when k ≤ 25 we have that ci ≤ cm and therefore only
the monopolists invest whereas when k > 25 then ci > cmand only the insiders invest.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Each manager in a monopoly invests as long as c ≤ ecmj when j other managers invest (j = 0, 1, 2),
where Πmj+1 − ecmj = Πmj . When the outsider invests in the duopoly, each insider invests if
c ≤ ecij,1 depending whether the other insider invests or not (j = 0, 1) where Πij+1,1− ecij,1 = Πij,1.
Similarly, when the outsider does not invest, the cutoﬀ points are ecij,0 (j = 0, 1) with the
analogous definitions. The cutoﬀ values for the single-manager firms are the same as in the
proof of Proposition 1, ecoj = coj and ectj = ctj .
Lemma 3 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: ect2 < ect1 < ect0 < eco0; ecm < ect1; ecm < eci1 <eci0 < ect0; eco2 < eco0 and eci1 < ect1 where for simplicity we denote ecm ≡ ecm2 and ecij ≡ eci1,j.
Proof. In the monopoly structure, ecm0 = k(2+k)12 , ecm1 = k(2+3k)12 and ecm2 = k(2+5k)12 . We have that
all the managers investing is an equilibrium whenever c ≤ ecm2 whereas no manager investing is
an equilibrium whenever c > ecm0 . Between ecm0 and ecm2 both equilibrium coexist but the former
is chosen because it Pareto dominates the latter. Then ecm0 and ecm1 are not relevant. In the
duopoly structure, the cutoﬀs for the insiders are eci0,0 = 2k(1+k)9 , eci0,1 = 2k9 , eci1,0 = 2k(1+3k)9 andeci1,1 = 2k(1+2k)9 . The same argument as in the monopoly case applies here and only the cutoﬀs
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in which the partner invests are relevant. In turn, the relevant cutoﬀs for the outsiders are the
ones in which none or all the insiders invest. The cutoﬀs for the outsider and the triopolists are
obtained in the proof of the previous proposition. Straightforward algebra leads to the ordering.
Lemma 4 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ ecm the managers in the monopoly and the insiders in the duopoly invest.
b) If ecm < c ≤ eci1 or max{eci1,eco2} < c ≤ eci0 there is an equilibrium in which the insiders in
the duopoly invest whereas the managers in the monopoly never invest.
c) If eci1 < c ≤ min{eco2,eci0} and eci0 < c ≤ eco0 the insiders and the monopolists never invest and
at least one single-manager firm invests.
d) If c > eco0 nobody invests.
Proof. a) We can distinguish two subcases: a.1) When c ≤ min{ecm,eco2}, from Lemma 3, all the
managers invest because all the cutoﬀs are above. a.2) When eco2 ≤ c < ecm the outsider does not
invest by definition and there may be a triopolist that does not invest (when ect2 ≤ c < ecm). In
other situations, all managers invest.
b) Here the monopolists stop investing. Again we can distinguish two subcases: b.1) whenecm < c ≤ eci1 the insiders always invest independent of the outsider decision. From Lemma
3, depending on the combination of parameters, the outsider may or may not invest whereas
there are two or three triopolists doing so. b.2) If max{eci1,eco2} < c ≤ eci0 there are two possible
equilibria in the duopoly: either the insiders do invest and the outsider does not or vice versa.
Again from Lemma 3 we can check that there might be one or two triopolists investing.
c) Here the insiders and the monopolists never invest. We distinguish five subcases: c.1)
when eci1 < c ≤ ect2 the three triopolists and the outsider invest, c.2) when max{ect2,eci1} < c ≤
min{eco2,ect1} or when max{eco2,eci0} < c ≤ ect1 two triopolist and the outsider invest, c.3) when
max{ect1,eci0} < c ≤ ect0 one triopolist and the outsider invests, c.4) when ect0 < c ≤ eco0 only the
outsider invest and c.5) when c > eco0 no one invests.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the following Lemma, we show that in our game we cannot have multiple stable regions when
there is no conflict .
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Lemma 5 For any combination of parameters, there is at most one stable structure.
Proof. Remember that we denote πm, πi and πo the ‘net’ profits for each monopolist, insider
and outsider (the equilibria in investment are unique). In order to consider all the possible cases
in the triopoly, denote πta ≥ πtb ≥ πtc the net profits obtained by each triopolist. In what follows
we state the conditions needed to ensure stability. The monopoly is stable when: (1) πm ≥ πi
and (2) if πtb ≤ πi then πm ≥ πo whereas if πtb > πi then πm ≥ πta (remember that the deviator
is always ”optimistic”). The duopoly is stable when (3) πi > πm or πo > πm and (4) if πtb ≤ πi
then πi ≥ πo whereas if πtb > πi then πi ≥ πta. The second part of condition (4) is never satisfied
(πta ≥ πtb) and hence condition (4) can be rewritten as (4’) both πtb ≤ πi and πi ≥ πo should
hold. Finally, the triopoly is stable whenever (5) πta > πm and (6) πtb > πi.
We are going to show the result by contradiction. Suppose firstly that the monopoly and
the duopoly are stable at the same time. From (1) and (3), we get that πo > πm and from (2)
and (4’) that πm ≥ πo and hence a contradiction. Secondly, the duopoly and the triopoly can
not be simultaneously stable structures because (4’) and (6) can not be satisfied at the same
time. Finally, suppose that the monopoly and the triopoly are stable structures. From (2) and
(6) we obtain that πm ≥ πta which is in contradiction with (5).
Thanks to the following lemma, we know that the triopoly will never be a stable structure.
Lemma 6 Managers always prefer the monopoly to the triopoly.
Proof. Suppose firstly that the monopolists do not invest. By Lemma 1 none of the triopolists
invests either. Since Πm0 =
1
12 >
1
16 = Π
t
0,0 the monopoly is always preferred. Next suppose
that a given manager invests both in monopoly and in triopoly. Again, the monopoly is always
preferred since Πm3 =
(1+3k)2
12 >
(1+3k)2
16 = Π
t
1,0 > Πt1,1 > Πt1,2. Last, take the case in which a
manager would invest as a monopolist but not as a triopolist. He would prefer a monopoly to
a triopoly in which none of the other triopolists invests when Πm3 − c > Πt0,0 or in other words
when c < 1+24k+36k248 . This is always the case in this region since c < cm <
1+24k+36k2
48 . When
there are one or two other triopolists investing, the monopoly is even more preferred.
Lemma 7 Managers prefer the monopoly than being insiders in a duopoly.
Proof. First suppose that a given manager invests both in the monopoly and being insider
in a duopoly. Since Πm3 =
(1+3k)2
12 >
(1+4k)2
18 = Π
i
2,0 > Πi2,1, the insiders would never deviate
from a monopoly. Second, he always prefers the monopoly whenever he does not invest in either
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situation because Πm0 =
1
12 >
1
18 = Π
i
0,0 > Πi0,1. Third, take the case in which he would invest
in the monopoly but not in the duopoly (from Lemma 1 the outsider does not invest in this
region either). The monopoly is preferred whenever Πm3 − c > Πi0,0 or in other words when
c < 1+18k+27k236 . This is always the case here since c < cm <
1+18k+27k2
36 . Finally suppose that
as an insider he would invest but not as a monopolist (again the outsider does not invest). He
prefers the monopoly as long as Πm0 > Πi2,0− c or c > −1+16k+32k
2
36 . Since c > cm >
−1+16k+32k2
36
this is always the case in this region.
Lemma 8 The monopoly is the unique stable structure when being in a monopoly is better than
being an outsider (πm ≥ πo) or when insiders in a duopoly would break for triopoly (πtb > πi) .
Otherwise, no industry structure is stable.
Proof. Each one of these conditions, together with Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, ensure that
conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 5 are satisfied and hence the monopoly is the
(unique) stable structure. We show the second statement by contradiction. Suppose firstly that
these conditions are not satisfied and that the duopoly is stable. From Lemma 5 the duopoly
could only be stable when the monopoly is not or in other words when πtb ≤ πi and πo > πm.
From Lemma 7 we have that πm > πi and hence πi ≥ πo. This contradicts the condition (4’) in
the proof of Lemma 5. Secondly, from Lemma 6 the triopoly is never stable.
Lemma 9 When there is no internal conflict within firms, the monopoly is the only stable struc-
ture. No stable structure exists when (c, k) are such that k1 ≤ k < k2 and c ≤ ct2, where
k1 = 4
√
2−5
21 and k2 =
2
√
3−3
3 .
Proof. We are going to prove this lemma following the four parts identified in Lemma 2:
a) We have that πt = Πt1,2 − c > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever k < k1 = 4
√
2−5
21 and that
πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo1,2− c = πo whenever k ≥ k2 = 2
√
3−3
9 . From Lemma 8 the monopoly is stable
if k < k1 or k ≥ k2 whereas if k1 ≤ k < k2 no industry structure is stable.
b) We are going to show that at least one of the two conditions in Lemma 8 is satisfied. On
the one hand we show that when k ≥ 115 we have that πm ≥ πo. If the outsider does invest,
πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo1,2 − c = πo when k ≥ k2 and in particular when k ≥ 115 . If the outsider does
not invest, πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo0,2 = πo when c ≤ −1+34k+11k
2
36 . This inequality is always satisfied
when k ≥ 115 and c < ci.
On the other hand we show that when k < 115 we have that πtb > πi. Take first the case
in which no triopolist invests (c > ct0). We have that πt = Πt0,0 > Πi2,0 − c (and in particular
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that πt > Πi2,1 − c) whenever c > −1+64k+128k
2
144 . This is always satisfied when k <
1
15 and
c > ct0. Second consider the case where only one triopolist invests. From the definition of
the cutoﬀs (see proof of Lemma 1), the outsider always invests in this region when we impose
k < 115 . In addition, we have that πtb = Πt0,1. We have that πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever
c > −1+66k+63k2144 . This is always satisfied when k <
1
15 and c > ct1. Last take the case in
which two triopolists invest (again here the outsider would invest). In this case πtb = Πt1,1 and
πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever k <
√
2−1
6 and in particular when k <
1
15 .
c) In the part of this region where only the monopolists invest we have that πt = Πt0,0 >
Πi0,0 = πi and hence the monopoly is the stable structure. When the insiders invest, we have
that πt = Πt0,0 > Πi2,0 − c = πi whenever c > −1+64k+128k
2
144 . This condition is always satisfied
since c > cm ≥ −1+64k+128k2144 .
d) Similar to the first part of part c), the monopoly is stable since πt = Πt0,0 > Πi0,0 = πi.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
In this and in the following proofs we are going to use, when possible, Lemma 5. In fact, it
applies as long as there is not multiplicity of equilibria in the duopoly investment decisions. As
we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 the region (a) can be divided in two parts.
a.1) When any manager in any situation invests, the stable structures and the proofs are
identical to those of Proposition 3 when everyone was investing.
a.2) The monopoly is stable because it is preferred to any other position in any other industry
structure. We have that πm = Πm3 −c > Πi2,0−c = πi and that πm > Πt1,1−c > Πt1,2−c and hence
managers prefer the monopoly to being insiders and being triopolists investing (independent of
being two or three of them doing so). They prefer the monopoly to being outsiders when
πm ≥ Πo0,2 = πo or when c ≤ −1+34k+11k
2
36 and the monopoly to being triopolists not investing
when πm ≥ Πt0,2 or when c ≤ 1+36k+24k
2
48 . These two conditions are always satisfied in this region
( eco2 ≤ c < ecm). Thus, the monopoly is stable and from Lemma 5 it is unique.
Proof of Proposition 5
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 this region can be divided in two parts.
b.1) Here the uniqueness result still applies. Managers prefer being insiders than monopolists
whenever c ≤ c1(k) = −1+12k+18k
2
36 : when the outsider invests πi = Πi2,1 − c > Πm0 = πm
25
precisely when c ≤ c1(k) whereas when he does not we have that πi = Πi2,0 − c > Πm0 = πm
is always satisfied in this region. In addition, πi ≥ πtb independent of the number of triopolists
investing and of the choice of the outsider. They also prefer to be an insider than an outsider,
πi ≥ πo, independent of the outsider investment decision. This three conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient to ensure duopoly stability (see proof of Lemma 5).
When c > c1(k), we have that managers in a monopoly do not invest whereas in any other
situation all managers invest (see proof of Lemma 4). Managers prefer the monopoly to being
insiders by definition. They also prefer the monopoly to the triopoly πm = Πm0 > Πt1,2 −
c = πt and hence the triopoly is never stable. Choices between monopoly and outsider and
between insider and triopoly are going to determine three diﬀerent regions. Managers prefer
being monopolists than outsiders whenever c ≥ c2 = 136 and they prefer being insiders to
triopolists whenever k ≥ k1 (see proof of Proposition 3). This defines three regions because: (a)
c01(k) > 0 and the k∗ such that c1(k∗) = eci1(k∗) is larger than the k∗∗ such that c2 = eci1(k∗∗)
and (b) the k∗∗∗ such that c2 = eci0(k∗∗∗) is larger than k1. In the first region, when k ≤ k1,
the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the second part of (2) are satisfied. In the
second region, when k ≥ k1 and c < c2 no structure is stable. The monopoly is not stable
because condition (2) is not satisfied and the duopoly is not stable because managers prefer
being outsiders than insiders (πo > πm ≥ πi) breaking condition (4’). Finally, when c ≥ c2 (and
c > c1(k)) the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the first part of (2) are satisfied.
b.2) There are two diﬀerent equilibria in the duopoly (Lemma 4): either the two insiders
or the outsider invest. The profits in the investing equilibrium are always higher than in the
non-investing one for both the insiders and the outsider (Πi2,0 − c ≥ Πi0,1 and Πo1,0 − c ≥ Πo0,2).
Denoting the net profits in the insiders-investing equilibrium as πid and πod and in the outsider-
investing one as πie and πoe, we have that πid > πie and πod < πoe.
We restate the stability conditions in order to accommodate this multiplicity. The monopoly
is stable when: (M1) πm ≥ πid and (M2) if πtb ≤ πie then πm ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then
πm ≥ πta. The insiders-investing duopoly is stable when (M3) πid > πm or πod > πm and (M4)
if πtb ≤ πie then πid ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then πid ≥ πta. The outsiders-investing duopoly is
stable when (M5) πie > πm or πoe > πm and (M6) if πtb ≤ πie then πie ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then
πie ≥ πta. The second part of condition (M6) is never satisfied (πta ≥ πtb) and hence condition
(M6) can be rewritten as (M6’) both πtb ≤ πie and πie ≥ πoe should hold. Finally, the triopoly is
stable whenever (M7) πta > πm and (M8) πtb > πid.
Now we are going to show that the insiders-investing duopoly is stable. Firstly πid = Πi2,0−c >
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Πm0 = πm whenever c ≤ −1+16k+32k
2
36 which is always true in this region. Hence condition (M3)
is satisfied. We also have that πtb > πie independent of having one or two triopolists investing.
If there is one clearly πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi0,1 = πie whereas if there are two πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi0,1 = πie
whenever c ≤ 1+52k+28k2144 which is always true when c < ect1. Finally, the condition πid > πta is
also satisfied since πid = Πi2,0− c > Πt1,0− c > Πt1,1− c in this region (as a triopolist, it is always
better to be investing). The second part of condition (M4) is satisfied and hence this structure
is stable.
This is the unique stable structure. The monopoly is not stable because, as we have seen,
πid > πm in contradiction with (M1). The outsider-duopoly is not stable either because πtb > πie
and hence condition (M6’) does not hold. Finally, the triopoly is not stable because πid > πta ≥ πtb
contradicts condition (M8).
Proof of Proposition 6
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 this region (c) can be divided in five parts. Here
the uniqueness result applies. Managers clearly prefer to be monopolists rather than insiders
(πm = Πm0 > Πi0,0 > Πi0,1). We also have that πtb > πi everywhere except when there are three
triopolists investing (case c.1) where this is true only when c < c3(k) = 1+34k+k
2
144 . Indeed, when
there are three triopolists investing this is the condition such that πtb = Πt1,2 − c > Πi0,1 = πi.
When there are two investing we have that πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi0,1 = πi whenever c < 1+52k+28k
2
144
which is always the case when c < ect1. Clearly, when there is only one πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi0,1 = πi
(the outsider always invests) and where there is none πtb = Πt0,0 > Πi0,0 > Πi0,1.
On the other hand, we have that πm ≥ πta in all cases except when there is only one triopolist
investing where this is true only when c > c4(k) = −1+18k+27k
2
48 . Indeed, when there is only one
triopolist investing this is the condition such that πm = Πm0 ≥ Πt1,0 − c = πta (we can check
that the it is better to be the one investing). When there are two investing we have that
πm = Πm0 ≥ Πt1,1− c = πta whenever c > −1+12k+12k
2
48 and this is satisfied when c > eci1. Therefore
they also prefer the monopoly to being triopolist when the three invest. When none of the
triopolists invests, clearly πm = Πm0,0 > Πt0,0 = πt.
Hence in all region c) except when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) or when
there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k), the monopoly is the unique stable structure.
Conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 5 are satisfied.
When there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k) the triopoly is the unique stable struc-
ture. In this region we have seen that πta > πm and, as before, πtb > πi satisfying conditions (5)
27
and (6).
Finally, when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) there is no stable structure.
We have that πo = Πo1,0−c > Πm0 = πm when c < 1+10k+7k
2
18 and πo = Πo1,0−c > Πi0,1 = πi when
c < 1+16k+16k236 . These two conditions hold when c < ect2. Then, since πtb ≤ πi, the monopoly is
not stable because it would contradict condition (2). The duopoly is not stable either because
πo > πi contradicts condition (4’). Lastly, the triopoly is not stable because we have showed
that πm ≥ πta, which is in contradiction with condition (5).
This completes the proof. QED
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Figure 1: Investment Nash Equilibria when 
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Figure 2: Investment Nash Equilibria when 
               there is internal conflict 
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Figure 3: Stable market structures when 
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Figure 5: Stable market structures when there is 
                a possibility of internal conflict (k = 1/2)
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Figure 6: Socially optimal market structures           
                when there is no internal conflict 
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